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Last month, we dipped a toe into the sticky, sludgy pool 
of ideas that make the unstable ground for discussions 
about animality—what it means to be animal, what it 
means to be human, and how the long-standing distinc-
tions between the two came to be taken for granted. Here, 
the historical basis for anthropocentrism is taken up again 
in a myriad of ways, some of them more abstract and 
poetic, others with a lucidity that fulills itself by mak-
ing everything else less clear. Keeping soft tread, we’re 
moving away from an active, communicative relation-
ship with our nonhuman counterparts; this issue of ANI-
MALITY keeps its cool, stays quiet, and allows for careful 
observation. But what we mean by careful might actually 
imply the opposite—for it’s not about standing at a safe 
remove, allowing disinterestedness to creep in. Rather, 
what’s careful about our looking requires a thoughtful-
ness the fathers of Western philosophy would undoubt-
edly scof at. Which begs the question: How can we ad-
dress the nonhuman carefully, thoughtfully, without falling 
back on the origins of thought? Next to other animals, can 
our rationale ever be truly self-explanatory, self-evident?
 
From observation to experimentation, our fear of losing 
grip on ourselves, on a self, has prevented humans from 
de-privileging the civilized. In order to break free of our 
pedagogical habits—and really, we may be the only caged 
animal with such obliviousness to our circumstances—
the same mechanisms for understanding animality must 
change. Contemporary art holds ample potential in this re-
spect, which our contributors this month are privy to. By 
making materiality material again, artists enable particular 
interpretive tools that beter lend themselves to notions of 
nonhuman agency. In each of the texts to follow, the inter-
pretation of artworks is revealed as a bridge between ani-
mals, bringing us down a peg, a litle bit closer to the earth 
and that sticky, sludgy, primal mess. We like it here, where 
the authority of certain bodies dissolves into the fray; unex-
pectedly, there’s no place to go but down. Or maybe, it’s a 
mater of anywhere but up. The clouds have been tethered 
to the screen, and the demand for high pedestals, high cul-
ture, and high abstraction is dwindling. Given that we’re 
in the business of the later, we’re not calling time of death 
—merely suggesting that the experience of being alive far 
outweighs that of being superior, and the face of criticality 
doesn’t always have to look like a Greek statue. 
Down the rabbit hole we go, stripped of old outits and cast 
in luorescent green light. 
An Animal Who
Writes Leters
 i al o
rites e ers
The proper deinition of a man is an animal who writes leters. 
lewis carroll
Depending on the season, a varying amount of water will soak into 
the mountain. It may fall in abundance from the sky as rain, or it 
may be slowly released into the cracked rock as accumulated snow 
melts.
The water gradually permeates the Earth, commited to the ininite 
work of saturating a mountain, a lifetime of deepening and moving 
away from the surface. It warms as it descends the thermal gradient 
of the Earth, eager that it might be geting close to something.
And then, after hundreds of years of progress, its path is abruptly 
interrupted.
It meets a deep scar, an ancient snag—a thrust-fault which began 
forming over 140 million years ago by bending, folding, breaking, 
and stacking sedimentary sheets of rock. Unwillingly, the water is 
redirected, pressured to follow this buried geological suture that 
runs diagonally through the Earth. It is disoriented and hostile to be 
turned around and ushered back up the slope.
p. 6
Although it felt like it had been approaching 
something, it never expected to ind anything 
as concrete as the botom of a mountain. It had 
explored in the belief of an open-ended abyss.
It was aggravated to ind a botom that slanted 
upward, inducing a sinister cycle. A return to the 
surface is an infuriating outcome after years of 
excavating layered depths.
On some level it must have known this was 
coming; its existence is inescapably cyclical. 
If it wasn’t the fault line, it would eventually 
come across another system to break its deep 
meditation. With  reclusive  yearnings it  relects 
on  the  way  it  is  handled  by  its surroundings, 
passed this way and that.
In quiet retaliation, the now hot water slowly eats 
away at the inside of the mountain, dissolving 
its minerals and absorbing gasses as it is pushed 
upwards through rock. On the way, bacteria are 
atracted to the mineral-rich water, the product of 
its fervency. They feast on it, stripping it of oxygen 
so that it is left stinking of rot.
It is seething and reeking when it confronts the 
brightness of the surface, a startling contact after 
centuries of dark, deep searching. It devises 
plans to get under the mountain, while the wind 
unceremoniously sweeps leaves that stick and 
scummy mats of algae setle on its face.
p. 7
These waters form the critical habitat of a 
unique organism that is found nowhere 
else on Earth: Physella johnsoni, the Banf 
springs snail. This snail grows out of the very 
emergence of this frustrated water. It crawls 
close to the deep heat and feeds of of the 
microbial mats that form, scraping them with 
its dentated chitinous tongue. It absorbs and 
embodies the cyclic disposition of the water – 
itself just the size of a droplet.
It is a slowly moving, fortiied drop. A soft body 
enclosed within hard layers.
It carries a smaller mountain on its back, secreted 
from its mantle in delicate eccentric layers. Its 
body more than fully occupies this twisting cavity, 
spilling out and then withdrawing to its cave-
like aperture as it moves through the world. The 
snail may faintly recollect the suppressed thermal 
memories from the water that it absorbs; waters that 
have passed though the Earth’s sedimentary layers 
now lap against faint striations in the shell. The 
inside of one mountain becomes the shell of another.
A drop that once moved within the mountain now 
atempts to get underneath it, to pick it up onto its 
shoulders, to transport it, to be in command of its 
own locomotion. This may be an atempt to make 
itself greater than its home, but the organism is far 
too entwined with its mountain to make a distinction. 
Its body and home are deeply and physically twisted 
into each other, and cannot separate. It cannot turn 
its back to its home, as a mater of posture.
p. 8
This is considered unusual, as most freshwater snails 
have the aperture on the right, and a dextral (counter-
clockwise coiling) shell. Johnsoni’s shell coils the 
wrong way, sinistrally, with whorls turning clockwise 
as it twists into a short spire.
Through their posture, researchers empathize with 
the snail, curving their spines, bending their knees, 
turning their chin toward their chest, and slowing 
their breath to steady themselves. They visually 
scour the ground before landing each foot, refraining 
from their normal gait and walking in slow, careful 
steps. They restrain their arms and legs, and curl 
their bodies to know the snail by momentarily 
assuming its cramped form. Eventually, however, 
their limbs must outstretch, bodies uncoil and stand 
upright, turning back after a long days’ work.
Human researchers of the snail spend most 
of their time in a crouching position. Every 
four weeks for the past ten years, dedicated 
scientists return to the springs to count each 
and every one. Its species made human history 
by becoming the irst mollusc to be classiied 
as endangered. The fewest found were 50 
snails, which accounted for the entire species’ 
population.
In 1926, the snail was irst oicially named 
by malacologist William J. Clench, likely 
to honour his friend, naturalist Charles W. 
Johnson, who had encouraged him to pursue 
the study of mollusks. 
Johnsoni was described using abstract concepts 
like “left” and “clockwise” to compare it to our 
own human orientation. With the apex of the 
shell pointing upwards, when facing you the 
well-rounded aperture is located on the left-
hand side. 
p. 9
Our human bodies, our limbs, allow us to handle 
and tread upon our surroundings, knowing it 
by manipulation. We are just as entwined as 
Johnsoni is with our surroundings, yet we create 
distance by extending limbs and omiting what 
we turn our back to. Our universe appears to 
us, formed by what we choose to atend to.
Both we and Johnsoni are dizzy organisms, 
moving slowly to compensate for our inability 
to escape our posture. The snail slows its pace 
at the idea of being apart from its home. We 
quickly move through the world, but then slow 
to a crawl at the moment we feel displaced from 
the centre of it.
Extensive eforts are taken to conserve the snail 
and its habitat, to keep it at arm’s length, or within 
arm’s-reach, of our atention. Bathing at the source 
of the natural springs is restricted because it is a 
threat to Johnsoni. The chemicals on our skin would 
contaminate the water, and we would disturb the 
fragile microbial mats where it feeds and lays eggs. 
Unable to soak our bodies in its warmth, we must 
setle to look longingly from a distance, and always 
amongst the lingering odour of roten eggs. This 
penalty is too great for most tourists to endure—
so we steal moments of contact with the hot water 
by illegally dipping our legs, arms, and hands into 
the steamy pools. Researchers track this activity 
annually; one year, there was upwards of 120,450 
dipped limbs.
p. 10
Perhaps this unsanctioned gesture of only 
partial immersion signals a confused desire 
to lose our limbs completely, to give up 
our ability to seize the world by hand and 
to trample it underfoot. We feel the heat 
distinguish our limbs from our core, we 
see our hands underwater, distorted by the 
ripples and tinted cyan.
Perhaps limb-dipping is a gesture to possess 
that fragility, to know it in an atempt to claim 
it. We reach in to take something away way 
with us, to unite ourselves with something 
distinct from ourselves, something that we 
currently lack.
We ind ourselves psychologically twisted, as 
Johnsoni is physically. We both sufer from 
and indulge in a perceived separation from 
our environment.
Less water inds its ways into the mountain 
rock now, and less makes the journey back 
up to the surface. It makes sense that the 
desiccated empty husks of Johnsoni would be 
found scatered around the openings of the 
dried up springs. The water doesn’t seem to be in the 
right places anymore, according to human analysis. 
With envy, we commit to conserving Johnsoni, an 
organism that exists in its home so viscerally.
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in Black 
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Explorations on 
Animalario by Nuria Cubas
Animalario is a video art project released by the 
Spanish artist and ilmmaker Nuria Cubas (born in 
Madrid in 1984) between 2011 and 2012. Though 
technically dated by its release, the work is always in 
progress – or rather, always holds the possibility of 
being continued. Watching the chapters composing 
this video (of which there are currently thirteen) the 
irst question that arises is, in the words of a famous 
John Berger’s essay title, “Why look at animals?” 
In the essay, he remarks that in the origin story of 
man, “the irst subject mater for painting was ani-
mal. Probably the irst paint was animal blood. Pri-
or to that, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the 
irst metaphor was animal” (Berger 1980, 5). Which means 
that, as Berger argues,
If the irst metaphor was animal, it was because the 
essential relation between man and animal was met-
aphoric. Within that relation what the two terms—
man and animal—shared in common revealed what 
diferentiates them. And vice versa (Berger 1980, 5). 
Berger considers that Aristotle’s History of Animals had al-
ready highlighted quantitative and comparative diferenc-
es between animal and man. It was a text of philosophical 
inquiry, in which, according to Michael Camille, “animals 
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This paper has been presented at 
the International conference “Hu-
man and Nonhuman Animals: 
Liberation, History and Critical 
Animal Studies,” held on October 
6-7, 2015, at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences and Humanities (FCSH) 
at the New University of Lisbon 
(UNL). I wish to thank Nuria Cu-
bas for giving permission to use 
her work and for welcoming my 
proposal to present it.
are seen as useful objects of human nature and not 
as they appear in the Bestiary, as symbolic repre-
sentations…” (Camille 1999, 358). Aristotle’s History 
of Animals in fact acknowledged a common inter-
est in the Physiologus, whose authorship was and is 
unknown.  The frequently assumed Christian text, 
composed of animal fables, was writen in Greek, 
translated into Latin and vernacular languages, 
and circulated all over Europe in the Middle Ages. 
Presumably writen in Alexandria around the third 
century, this book, composed of between forty and 
forty-eight chapters in its irst version, and after-
wards expanded or emended in some parts, in-
luenced the medieval imaginary. Despite its title, 
which could be translated as “the naturalist,” the 
philologist Michael J. Curley points out that
Physiologus was never intended to be a trea-
tise on natural history. ... Nor did the word ... 
ever mean simply “the naturalist” as we un-
derstand the term ... but one who interpreted 
metaphysically, morally, and, inally, mysti-
cally the transcendent signiicance of the natu-
ral world (Curley 1979, xv).
It is, therefore, considered the basis of medieval bes-
tiaries—a literary genre whose illustrations and an-
atomic description of animals and their behaviors 
mixed with fantastic and legendary tales. The sub-
sequent fascination with exotic animals promoted 
the “collection” of animals—and the creation of zo-
ological parks—as curiosities between the 16th and 
19th centuries. The growth of this practice was two-
fold: on the one hand, it served to develop scientiic 
investigation, while on the other hand functioned 
as a status symbol, since collectors were members 
of the wealthier classes and aristocracy. 
The process enabled by Nuria Cubas in Animalario 
is signiicantly diferent, being neither biologic nor 
symbolic. Although composed by a ilmic collec-
tion portraying animals in the place they live, Cu-
bas’ representation does not aim to document with 
scientiic purposes or transigure moral prescriptions, 
anecdotes, and humorous stories—nor does she atempt 
to ofer a gaze on the animals as an exotic otherness. At 
the same time she appropriates the term “animalario,” 
distancing it from its original meaning. According to the 
dictionary of the Real Academia Española (R.A.E.), “anima-
lario” refers to the building containing animals destined 
to laboratory experiments. Conversely, Cubas’ Animalar-
io seems to knock down the walls of this building, or its 
theoretical implications, rather, to make space for human 
and non-human animals to observe and even confront 
each other.
Cubas indulges in a slow observation of animal behav-
iors, shape and physical characteristics that registers as 
distinct from any voyeuristic atempt of documenting an-
imal species, as could happen during a journey on vaca-
tion. Rather, the viewer participates in the image, and is 
invited to put into action the repertoire of sounds owned 
by his or her aural memory while following the mute video, 
whose black and white awakens an atemporal imaginary 
of sounds. What is presented in Cubas’ work, borrowing 
the title of a book by Italian philosopher Guido Ceroneti, 
is “the silence of the body” (Ceroneti 1979)—even if the 
body to which he referred is the human. By silencing the 
sounds of non-human animals featured in Anima-
lario, Cubas entices, or even accelerates, our projec-
tions, thoughts and feelings in the animals ilmed. 
Interestingly, this work was carried out at the same 
period in which the “animal turn” emerged in critical 
studies as a ield of inquiry. After watching Anima-
lario for the irst time in June 2013, I asked the artist, 
through our ongoing email conversation, what ques-
tions had motivated her to ilm non-human animals 
in this particular way. It was her irst time taking 
non-human animals as her subject; until that time 
she had ilmed mostly people and often in domestic 
setings. She replied that her irst atempt, when she 
started this project, was something for her basic and 
simple, and continued explaining as follows:
What interested me in looking at the animals 
is that we all establish a comparative relation-
ship with them, in other words, on the one 
hand we are conscious that they are “irratio-
nal” animals and this, apparently, distances them 
from us rational humans. On the other hand, we 
compare ourselves to them; for instance, if it seems 
to us that the ostrich’s neck is exaggeratedly long 
it is because we are comparing his neck to ours. 
Or if the bear assumes one or another posture or 
if the horse’s mane is shining a lot, we are always 
comparing them with our own size. […] This com-
parison occurs with an ostrich or a turkey, animals 
which are not even mammals, but in which we can 
see behaviors that mirror us. Certainly, this never 
happens in so direct a form with other elements 
from nature, like a tree or a stone. With an animal 
it is immediate, even when we talk about insects, 
immediate and super ancestral, placing that we are 
fascinated observing animals in all the stages of our 
life (perhaps because we also learn things about 
ourselves). 
In contrast to the standard set by the Physiologus, which 
became an exemplar for depicting animals through writen 
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Lo que me interesó de ver a los animales es que todos esta-
blecemos u a relación de com aración con ellos, decir, a la 
vez que somos conscientes de que son animales irracionales 
y eso, aparentemente los aleja de noso ros humanos racio-
nales, en el fondo n  comparamos con ellos, es decir, si nos 
parece que el avestruz ti ne el cuello exageradamente largo 
es porque estamos comparando su cuello con el n estro o si 
el oso coge esta u otr  postura o si al caballo le bri la mucho 
el pelo, siempre los estamos comparando con nue tra propia 
medid , es decir, e tablecem  con ellos una relación tan es-
trecha que mira do un pec ri de collar podemos id ntiicar-
nos a nosotros mi mos. Nos c rre incluso con un a struz 
o un pavo... Animales que ni siquiera son mamiferos, pero 
en los que podemos ver comportamientos que nos relejan. 
Por supuesto sto nunca nos ocurr de manera tan directa 
con otras cosas de la naturaleza como un árbol o una pie-
dra. Con una animal es inmediato, i cluso cu ndo hablamos 
de insectos, inmediato y uperancestral, puesto que nos fas-
cina bservar animales en todas las etapas de nuestra vida. 
(quizás porque aprendemos también cosas de nosotros mis-
mos). E-m il c rrespondence 6-06-2013.
descriptions that provide transcendental mean-
ings for the human, Cubas seeks to overcome the 
limitations of language as a document. Cubas re-
fers to the process of learning enacted in the hu-
man by observing the non-human animal. The 
additional step she carries out, which is closely 
connected to the materiality of the device she uses 
– a video camera – is the possibility to achieve this 
knowledge through a personal confrontation with 
the animal. Therefore, what is at stake is not only 
the subject observed, but also the subject observer, 
questioning the animal by starting with the self.  
Her statement relates the work directly to Har-
away’s notion of entanglement, describing “the 
inseparability of human and non-human worlds 
and of the ‘naturecultures’ that have evolved as 
a result.” [3] Moreover, living in a zoo or a park, 
in the countryside or in a garden, with their eyes 
to the camera, these animals are ofered—in the 
artist’s gaze and post-production efects, with no 
prejudices—to be contemplated. As Jacques Derri-
da writes in his essay “The Animal That Therefore 
I Am,” “The animal looks at us, and we are naked 
before it. Thinking perhaps begins there” (Derrida 
2008, 29). Cubas’ work seems to propose a new 
perspective on anthropomorphism, recalling the 
scholarship of Kari Weil, who notes:
On the one hand, as a process of identiica-
tion, the urge to anthropomorphize the expe-
rience of another, like the urge to empathize 
with that experience, risks becoming a form 
of narcissistic projection that erases boundar-
ies of diference. On the other hand, as a feat 
of atention to another and of imagination re-
garding the other’s perspective, this urge is 
what brings many of us to act on behalf of 
the perceived needs and desires of an other/
animal (Weil 2012, 19).
Every non-human animal species is ilmed sep-
arately and it is exactly this one-to-one relation-
16
ship between the viewer and the viewed that permits 
a deeper and engaged observation. In this sense, we 
can see a resemblance to Bill Viola’s I Do Not Know 
What It Is I Am Like (1986), even though both pieces 
maintain evident diferences as well. For instance, in 
the chapter “Egg Hatch”  the camera observes the 
entire process of a new life hatching, with her sounds; 
it transfers all the beauty of the moment and at the 
same time all the solitude of a birth. If Animalario 
seems to propose an approximation of the human 
and non-human animal, Bill Viola’s video apparently 
points out diferences and distances between them. 
According to Weil, I Do Not Know What It Is I Am Like 
“reminds us of the what that is at the foundation of 
every who and of the ways in which we humans try 
to distance ourselves from this what” (Weil 2012, 38). 
Abstaining from a documentary report, with a re-
sult closer to a novel description illed by introspec-
tive random thoughts, Cubas is able to shape in the 
viewer an intimate relationship with what they see. 
In other words, she opens the path toward an acti-
vation of Berger’s “irst metaphor.” Cubas also adds 
that, while conceiving this work, she was inspired 
by the notion of “becoming animal”—formulated by 
Deleuze and Guatari in their Kaka: Towards a Minor 
Literature (1986)— which is always political, a sort of 
escape from cultural and social codes. For instance, 
Kaka’s Gregor becomes an animal without losing his 
human condition. Therefore, the artist was intrigued 
by the hybridity that Kaka’s character suggests, at-
tempting to produce a similar efect in the spectator 
of Animalario and creating, in her words, “an inter-
mediary point in which the person humanizes the 
animal observing human behaviors, while animaliz-
ing himself recognizing his animal behaviors.” 
Moreover, I would argue that the varieties of animals 
ilmed: “The ostrich,” “the stag,” and “the turkey” 
in Elche, on the Eastern spanish coast; the “Latxas 
sheeps” and the cows in Euskadi, Northern spain; 
“the Polar bear” in Chapultepec zoo in Mexico; and 
the horses in Verbania, north of Italy, induce the 
viewer to construct a mental map, an atlas across 
which the geography of non-human life and human 
life is distributed, changeable, in transition. Recall-
ing again the idea of a “minor literature,” following 
Deleuze and Guatari, Animalario also reveals an ap-
parent deterritorialization or reconiguration of space 
and time, since its main trait is not that of framing the 
animals ilmed under any sort of systemic category, 
but rather creating an immediate mediation between 
human and non-human animals.
As a inal remark on these explorations, intended to 
be left open for further ones, I want to underscore that 
the apparent quietness and slowness of Animalario 
in reality atempts to lower the level of a supposed 
human superiority, recovering an approximation 
to non-human animals that human beings have di-
rected into two opposite and incompatible channels: 
conscious compassion on the one side, and sheer vi-
olence on the other. In this sense, the aesthetics char-
acterizing this work appear tied to an ethics that per-
mits us to see again what we think already know so 
well, to the astounding point of recognizing that we 
never really paid due atention to our animality.
Eventually, this point of view could be further ap-
proached through the challenging question posed by 
Pablo Neruda’s verses in his Book of Questions, pub-
lished posthumously in 1974. In one of the stanzas 
composing the poem, a succession of provocative 
questions about the equilibriums of nature—imbued 
with acute critiques to the political and social envi-
ronment in and out of his native country in those 
years—paradoxically invert the human perspective 
on these issues. Imagining an expedition to the moon, 
Neruda suggests mice and turtles, instead of human 
beings to explore this far-away place. The concluding 
question seems to challenge the superiority of the hu-
man over the non-human animal, asking: “Couldn’t 
the animals that engineer/hollows and tunnels/take 
charge of/these distant inspections?” 
17
Me parecía interesante el juego de ida 
y vuelta que se hace y para esto había 
t mado un término que Deleuze y Gu t-
tari utilizan n su t abajo sobre la obra de 
Kaka (Por u a literatura menor), que era 
el Devenir Animal. Ellos sostienen que 
n la obra de Kaka los pe sonajes se an-
im lizan sin llegar a perder su condición 
de humanos, digamos que se hacen híbri-
dos, pe o bueno,  interesó el término 
en la medida en qu  podía aplicarlo a ese 
efecto que se produce entre el espectador 
y el Animalario, un punto intermedio en 
el que l  persona humaniza al animal al 
ver en él comportamientos huma os y se 
animaliza a sí mis o al reconocer en él 
mis o comp rtamiento  i les.
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This paper is a condensed version of a presentation arranged 
with Amy Ratelle by KAPSULA, “Technologies of Pain: An-
imals and Anatomical Art,” which took place in Toronto on 
April 29, 2016.  
The ancient Greeks had two separate concepts for “life”—
zoe and bios. As described by Giorgio Agamben, zoe re-
fers to the “simple fact of living common to all living be-
ings” (quoted in Van Den Hengel 2012, 2). Bios, on the 
other hand, is the “socially qualiied life” (2) of (notably 
human) citizens that make up the politics of being alive. 
This split between one type of life and another discursively 
privileges the human at the expense of the animal and 
other life forms. Although the schism between zoe and 
bios has had lasting repercussions on our view of both 
non-human animals and medical science, “life” remains 
a shifty concept that has varied throughout history. Cer-
tainly the ancient Greeks had one view, but that view is 
not necessarily the same as early Christian philosophers, 
for example, and their view is distinct from Enlighten-
ment philosophers, who of course difer greatly from 
contemporary posthuman thinkers and bioartists.
 
The boundary set between “being alive” (or not) and be-
ing considered “a citizen” (or not) has tremendous impli-
cations for the writing and implementation of laws. This 
19
is especially signiicant for two reasons: irst, the most 
common law has been situated in notions of property – 
what can be owned; and second, when we consider how, 
historically, this boundary between rational and irratio-
nal, zoe and bios, has been drawn and re-drawn to keep 
all non-human animals and certain humans outside of it, 
and more importantly outside the framework of human 
rights.
After the 1876 Anti-Vivisection Act made amateur experi-
mentation illegal, animal experimentation was ultimately 
forced behind closed doors and into the hands of corpo-
rations and other medical institutions. The industry ex-
panded to include using animals not only for testing, but 
as raw material—the 1970s saw the earliest advancements 
in recombinant DNA technology. Animals of course 
sufered greatly in the earliest experiments, conducted 
without anaesthetic; they sufer again through a new re-
framing of DNA – the most basic evidence of zoe, or bare 
life—as raw material for manipulation by humans. This is 
particularly troubling when such material crosses species 
boundaries (Giglioti 2009, xvi). As Carol Giglioti phrases 
it, “animals have become code” (xvii).
Yet, twentieth-century advances in science have also en-
abled a new ield for cultural expression and exploration—
the ield of bioart—where animals, art and technology 
meet. Bioart can thus be deined as an art practice where-
in human artists work with living tissue, organisms, bac-
teria, and other material composites of natural life using 
scientiic processes (for example genetic engineering, tis-
sue cultures/cultivation, and cloning). This ield emerges 
from and critiques the long history of animal experimen-
tation, opening spaces to ask challenging questions: about 
“human” as a singular (and superior) identity, when our 
own bodies are clearly microbiomes, colonized by other 
life forms; about the signiicance and importance of those 
other life forms; and about our responsibility to those life 
forms.
While certainly not the earliest instance of bio or trans-
genic art, Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny is perhaps one of 
the most famous. In 2000, Kac announced his intention 
to adopt a genetically-modiied rabbit created by the 
National Institute of Agronomic Research (France). The 
rabbit’s DNA was combined with that of a phosphores-
cent jellyish, and when illuminated under black light her 
eyes, skin, and nails glow green. Named “Alba” by Kac, 
she was created to interact with him in a replicated do-
mestic space as part of an art exhibit.
A september 2000 article in the Boston Globe generated 
much media atention and public outcry over the project, 
and the Lab changed its mind. Alba was not released, and 
the exhibit did not go on as planned (nor could Kac bring 
her to his home in Chicago either), but the GFP Bunny 
was “out of the cage” – the merging of scientiically-cre-
ated life forms and art remains in the public imagination, 
inspiring those working in cultural ields to harness the 
tools of biotechnology and bring them out from behind 
the closed doors of the laboratory.
Working in a similar vein, in 2004 Natalie Jeremijenko and 
Eugene Thacker published Creative Biotechnology: A User’s 
Manual--a guide for lay audiences to engage with biotech-
nology in creative ways, making space for the “biotech 
hobbyist.” The book includes instructions on where to 
purchase mice for experiments, or how to grow your own 
skin. As Joanna Zylinska points out, however, this is a 
“risky strategy” in a post-9/11 world, where governments 
remain on high alert for all kinds of threats, bioterrorism 
included (Zylinska 2009, 151).
The question remains, however, whether creating living 
organisms for art is ethical or not, given that they are usu-
ally destroyed when the exhibit is over. Arguably, there 
is equal, if not greater ‘waste’ in the medical industry, in 
terms of both lab animals and other living forms. Produc-
tively, bioart exhibits invite these conversations, such as 
in the Tissue Culture & Art Project’s Semi-Living Worry 
Dolls (2000). These cultivated tissue forms borrow from 
the Guatemalan tradition of giving fabric worry dolls 
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to children, who are meant to conide in them and keep 
them under their pillows to absolve negative thoughts. 
The project is signiicant in its incorporation of what the 
artists call the “killing ritual”—where they release the tis-
sue sculptures from their containers and allow the public 
to touch them, which results in tissue death.  One of the 
artists, Oron Cats, explains:
The killing only takes place when we reach a point 
when no one can take care of the semi-living any 
longer. The killing ritual can be seen as either the 
ultimate pitiless act, as an essential show of com-
passion; euthanasia of a living being that has no 
one to care for it, or just returning it to the cultural 
accepted state of “a sticky mess of lifeless bits of 
meat.” It is important for us to be transparent in 
regard to the fate of the living art work at the end 
of the exhibition. It is also interesting to note that 
on some occasions, members of the public came to 
us after participating in the killing ritual and told 
us that only by killing the semi-living they believed 
that the work was actually alive (quoted in Quaranta 
2004, n.pag).
In the history of Western philosophy, particularly the 
philosophy of science, the notion of what is life, what is 
alive, is a common thread in both political thought and 
art-making—both with traditional media and emerging 
forms of new media. Technological advancement often 
outpaces ethical considerations and the law, leaving 
both areas to catch up after the fact. However, I argue 
that while there is a danger of artists and cultural work-
ers replicating the type of schisms between alive and 
not-alive that have formed the basis of so much of our 
political thought to date, work in this particular genre 
does crucially force public engagement with these 
deeply-rooted binaries between human and nonhuman. 
By making visible the raw material and matter of life, 
which we share with all other life forms, bioart holds 
the potential to challenge and even change our histor-
ically anthropocentric notions of human superiority.
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As I begin this inal column, I am turning around two dis-
parate things that I feel conident have some tangential 
connection, mining the possibility of interpretation for 
thinking-with and linking together. so far, I can only 
call the connection between these two things a close 
relative of “ambiguity”—a precious trophy word of in-
troductory postmodernism courses everywhere.
The irst disparate thing is ambiguity’s signiicance in 
dreaming. Returning from a recent trip to Montreal, to 
the school of Making Thinking’s Words & [] durational 
conference of art and thought (a weekend conference 
taking place over three days at the Darling Foundry, 
including eating and sleeping together in the space with 
presentations, performances and workshops at all hours), I 
was struck by a synchronousness between Freudian theory 
and contemporary science on dreams. 
According to Robert stickgold, a psychiatrist who studies 
dreaming at Harvard, only certain kinds of actions or events 
iniltrate dreams—not memories that are conscious or un-
derstood (what he calls “declarative memories”) but “im-
plicit memories,” which are di cult to access consciously. 
Implicit memories are events or actions or thoughts (“weak 
associations,” stickgold says) that remain tickling your 
brain (stickgold, 2000).
Following stickgold’s suit, I have been naming the things 
that fail to produce strong associations: the inarticulable, 
the undeclarative, the tentative, the spongey, the pussyfoot, 
the hedge, the pliable, the gestural, the allegorical, the on-
tological, the shrinking, the embodied, the repetitious, the 
ceaseless, the chewy, the pulsating, the exalted, the unin-
tentional, the anomic, the missed step on the way down the 
stairs, the too-long handshake, the vapourousness of tact. 
These spirits live so well in artworks—and live equally well 
in dreams, because they’re incalculable, stuck.
stickgold’s 1999 study traces the subliminal stickiness of 
Tetris, using the video game as a vehicle for studying what 
and how repetition, problem-solving, and being caught in 
the middle of something unsolvable do for dreams. Tetris, 
Stickgold’s data conirms, remains sticky dream-mater not 
only for people with unimpeded memory formation, but also 
for people with amnesia (who do not properly form declar-
ative memories). “One can only surmise,” stickgold con-
cludes, “that during REM sleep more unpredictable, poten-
tially valuable, but frequently useless, associations are tested 
and, when appropriate . . .  strengthened” (stickgold 2000). 
And this is not such a far cry from Freud’s methodology for 
studying dreaming; describing dream symbols as imperfect 
markers of content the dreamer had not yet solved or un-
derstood, he traced each symbol back through a series of 
free associations with his patients until the subliminal con-
tent revealed itself through the lateral actions of memory 
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(Freud 1980). I’m skeptical of stickgold’s research ac-
tually validating Freud’s—one being a set of data, and 
the other a treatment methodology that makes several 
assumptions about how the di culties we have pro-
cessing information and memories might be resolved 
by working backwards through free association. But 
the parallel between the two intrigues me.
The second disparate thing is this: in the two minutes it 
took me to snap a picture of Fernando and Humberto 
Campana’s Cake Stool in the relatively sparsely popu-
lated design galleries of the Musée des Beaux-Arts de 
Montréal, others approached to pay Instagram homage 
to this particular furniture beast. A slow creep of pass-
ers-by, linked only by the fact that something (what?) 
moved them to photograph the work.
The Campana brothers have developed an aesthetic 
producing luxury goods made from low materials—
furniture made with scrap wood from são Paulo slums, 
for example, or this piece whose accumulated pieces 
resemble midway-game-prizes. The animacy of Cake 
Stool means something diferent than the Campana’s 
other design works: there are eyes and faces, you are meant 
to recline on a pile of animal bodies, made to be cuddled 
and individuated. And while some are bears, raccoons, dogs 
(thoroughly domesticated), others are big cats—whose wild-
ness is contained and distorted through their kitsch-value. 
While I normally jump to claim that the animal is always a 
symbol or a stand-in, I ind this chair di cult in that its sym-
bolism is more about the inherent strangeness of commodity 
culture than about animals themselves. Is this what makes it 
Insta-grammable?
Vogue’s 2014 listicle “10 Works of Art to Instagram in New 
York this summer” (“don’t pretend like you didn’t spend 
more than an hour waiting at the Whitney just to snap that 
magical selie at Yayoi Kusama’s Firelies on the Water“) (Gar-
cia 2014) atests to the cultural cachet of Instagramming 
artworks—the allure of translating the experiential to the 
small, square, iltered, and ultimately digestible format. But 
I recognize in it some fascination with the atmospheric, the 
unexpected, the absurd, the still, the untouchable, the un-
speakable, the impatient, the stranger’s Craiglist mirror, the 
longing, the artwork made of inarticulate parts—the ambigu-
ities that live so well in analysis. They are replicating almost 
willfully in the culture of images around us. Reperformance 
and saturation persist as interpretative forms, in reverence 
and deiance—in work that trudges forward through the sog-
gy bulk of the cloud and lives perpetually in translation back 
to tangible space.  
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